It is therefore imperative that organizations that were vulnerable in the past also direct action to investigate exactly how patching occurred, and whether malicious activity persists. These techniques also include utilizing process injection and in-memory execution, which can make removal non-trivial. Fileless techniques, which include persistence via registry, scheduled tasks, WMI, and startup folder, remove the need for stable malware presence in the filesystem.
The LemonDuck operators also make use of many fileless malware techniques, which can make remediation more difficult. This allows them to limit visibility of the attack to SOC analysts within an organization who might be prioritizing unpatched devices for investigation, or who would overlook devices that do not have a high volume of malware present.
This self-patching behavior is in keeping with the attackers’ general desire to remove competing malware and risks from the device.
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They did so while maintaining full access to compromised devices and limiting other actors from abusing the same Exchange vulnerabilities. In some cases, the LemonDuck attackers used renamed copies of the official Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool to remediate the vulnerability they had used to gain access. Attackers then used this access to launch additional attacks while also deploying automatic LemonDuck components and malware.
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In March and April 2021, various vulnerabilities related to the ProxyLogon set of Microsoft Exchange Server exploits were utilized by LemonDuck to install web shells and gain access to outdated systems. These human-operated activities result in greater impact than standard infections. These activities always result in more invasive secondary malware being delivered in tandem with persistent access being maintained through backdoors. LemonDuck activity initiated from external applications – as against self-spreading methods like malicious phishing mail – is generally much more likely to begin with or lead to human-operated activity. LemonDuck attack chain from the Duck and Cat infrastructures External or human-initialized behavior We also provide guidance for investigating LemonDuck attacks, as well as mitigation recommendations for strengthening defenses against these attacks.įigure 2. These include general and automatic behavior, as well as human-operated actions. In this blog post, we share our in-depth technical analysis of the malicious actions that follow a LemonDuck infection. After installation, LemonDuck can generally be identified by a predictable series of automated activities, followed by beacon check-in and monetization behaviors, and then, in some environments, human-operated actions. LemonDuck spreads in a variety of ways, but the two main methods are (1) compromises that are either edge-initiated or facilitated by bot implants moving laterally within an organization, or (2) bot-initiated email campaigns. Today, beyond using resources for its traditional bot and mining activities, LemonDuck steals credentials, removes security controls, spreads via emails, moves laterally, and ultimately drops more tools for human-operated activity. As we discussed in Part 1 of this blog series, in recent months LemonDuck adopted more sophisticated behavior and escalated its operations. LemonDuck is an actively updated and robust malware primarily known for its botnet and cryptocurrency mining objectives.
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